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266; Chase v. Denny, 130 Mass. 566;
and many other cases.
The other class of cases is where one
has at the time of his sale or mortgage,
a potential, inchoate, or embryo interest
in the property nientioned, which subsequently ripens into a complete and perfect interest ; and then the title vests in
the first grantee as against third persons,
even though the property has much
changed or developed, and increased in
value since the first sale or mortgage
thereof. This is familiar law since the
days of Chief Justice HoBAnT: Grantham v. Hawley, Bob. 132. Therefore,
the owner of sheep may sell the next
year's growth of wool; or of a herd of
cows the next season's milk, or butter; the owner or lessee of land, the
future artificial crops, &a.: Cayce v. Stovall, 50 bliss. 396; Whitev. Thomas, 52
Id. 49 ; Thrash v. Bennett, 57 Ala. 156 ;
Stearnsv. Gafford, 56 Id. 544 ; Tones v.
Webster, 48 Id. 109; Butler v. Hill,
1 Baxter (Tenn.) 375; Stephens v.
Tucker, 55 Ga. 543; S. a. 58, Id. 391;
Cook v. Steel, 42 Tex. 53; McGee v.
_itzer, 37 Id. 27 ; Moore v. Byrumn, 10
So. C. 452; and many others.
This last is more obvious where the
crop has been in fact planted when the
mortgage or sale thereof is made; as
in Cotten v. Willoughby, 83 N. C. 75 ;
but many courts hold this not essential,

and declare that if the mortgagor owns
or has a lease of the land on which the
crop is to be raised, he may by apt terms
make a valid mortgage of an unplanted
crop therefrom: Arques v, llasson, 51
Cal. 620 ; Van Hoozer v. Cory, 34 Barb.
12; Conderman v. Smith, 41 Id. 404;
Watkins v. IVyatt, 9 Baxt, 250. Though
in the absence of statute this extension
of the law of potential existence is not
everywhere approved, See Tomlinson
v. Greenfield, 31 Ar),. 557; Hutcldnson
v. Ford, 9 Bush 318 ; Je4d v. Burrus,
58 Geo. 574.
But notwithstanding the substantial
uniformity of the decisions as to the general rule involved, in the principal case,
and when only the legal title is involved, as between successive purchasers
or mortgagees, yet there is a class of cases
following Holroyd v. Marshall, in which
in a court of equity the rights of the first
mortgagee or grantee will be protected,
as against certain parties claiming the
same after-acquired property by a succeeding conveyance from the same
grantor: Mitchell v. TVinslow, 2 Story
644; Beale v. Wite, 94 U. S. 382;
Brett v. Carter, 2 Low. 458 ; MfcCaffrey
v. Woodin, 65 N. Y. 459. But even this
is not uniformly assented to.
EDMUND I H. BENNETT.
Boston, April 1st 1885.
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BOYD v. CONKLIN.
A rural landowner has no right to put up such artificial barriers as will flood his
neighbor's land with surface water, that would otherwise escape over his own, for
the mere purpose of reclaiming the bed of a pond that had always been on his premises, and of getting rid of the inflow.
The maxim IISic utere tuo alienum non Ileas" applied.
VOL. XXXI=.-39

BOYD v. CONKLIN.
ERROR to

Lenawee.

A. L. Millard and Bean

Underwood, for plaintiff.

Merritt & Wooden and C. A. Stacy, for defendants.
CAMPBELL, J.-Boyd sued defendants for removing part of a
dam which he had built across the outlet which drained an adjoining highway and higher lands adjacent. Lorenzo D. Dewey owned
a farm running north of the highway about half a mile, and a
swale ran through this land from north to south, which crossed the
road through a culvert, from which the water flowed across Boyd's
farm to a pond on his land which has no surface outlet. The
swale is crossed by an old beaver dam near its north end, and a
creek called Evans's creek, a little to the north of it, sometimes
overflows, so that the water runs, over this beaver dam into the
swale. The swale carries down all the surface water on Dewey's
land, and there was testimony tending to show that it was partly
fed by springs, although this was disputed. Both farms are
inclosed by a ridge, which prevents any water passing from
Dewey's land from escaping except through the swale and into the
pond, and there is no other way of draining the highway. The soil
is clay, except to the south and east of the pond, where it is gravelly,
and where there is some escape of water by percolation, and possibly by a subterranean outlet.
Both farms seem to have been in private hands for above fifty
years. The road appears, by the testimony, to be the La Plaisance
Bay Turnpike, which was, as we are judicially informed by public
statute, laid out in 1882, and built by the United States government, and subsequently became subject to state authority, and is
now in charge of the ordinary town authorities. Just north of the
road (which runs east and west on the section line between sections
32 and 29, in township 5 S., of range 4 E.) the swale widens on
Dewey's land into a small pond. The pond on Boyd's land is
never dry, and before he built the dam contained usually from 6 to
8 acres, of- which a space of several acres became dried by means
of the exclusion of the water which came down from the lands
above, which had no other escape. The dam was a solid structure
12 feet thick at the base and 7 feet in the top, about a hundred
paces long, and higher than the highest part of the culvert or
highway. Its effect was to submerge the road, and also to throw
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the water all back over the highway and upon Dewey, where it
had no escape but by evaporation.
Boyd. purchased the farm, which contains a little over 90 acres,
in 1872, at which time there was no obstruction to the flowage.
He first built the dam in 1877, and it was removed, so as to give
room for the water, in 1878 by the highway commissioner. Being
rebuilt, it was removed in 1879 by defendants, under the direction
of the local authorities: Conklin himself being commissioner, and
acting in pursuance of their instructions. The case, as it is now
before us, presents no complications. The dam was built for the
sole and express purpose of shutting out the water, which had its
only outlet through the swale and over Boyd's land, and this was
its original and natural outlet. It was not artificial, but had always
existed since the country was known; and the existence of a
beaver dam makes it not unlikely that it was once a running
stream. Whether its waters are, to any extent, from spring or
not, they include the whole surface drainage, and are not confined
to passing storms. There is some testimony of occasional attempts
by the lower owners to obstruct the water, but no evidence of
acquiescence, and very little, if any, of submission by the highway
authorities to such obstructions.
If this had been an artificial drainage, the long existence of the
road, which could not be kept in repair without drainage, and
the undisputed fact that a regular culvert has existed at least since
1845, and that no other drainage was possible, would, in our
opinion, put plaintiff to very strong proof to overthrow the presumption of right. The court below gave plaintiff the benefit of
that analogy, and, going very far in the endeavor to avoid giving
occasion for cavil, limited defendant's justification to a substantially
uninterrupted enjoyment of the drainage for twenty years, without
substantial objection to the public or highway authorities. But
plaintiff insists that his right to intercept surface water cannot be
cut off in that way, and that, except in case of living waters in a
defined and regular channel, there is no such obstacle, or none
without such an undisputed prescriptive right as would be equivalent to a grant.
On the argument the whole subject was discussed with much
ability. It is not necessary, however, to consider any more of the
legal theories than such as have some application on the facts.
The real question here was whether one land-owner can, at his
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pleasure, erect such barriers as will flood his neighbor's land with
water that otherwise would escape over his own, in order to partially or wholly reclaim the bed of a pond which has always existed
there, and get rid of the inflow. In its natural condition neither
the highway nor the upper lands would be drowned. The effect
of the dam is to cover portions of them with water that cannot
escape.
It was urged strenuously on plaintiff's behalf that there is a
radical difference between the common and the civil law upon the
subject of the relations of upper and lower estates as to water
easements and servitudes, and that at common law the latter owes
no service to the former in regard to the flow of surface water. As
we ate not expected, officially, to be experts in the civil law, we
shall not attempt to discuss that department of jurisprudence as a
separate subject. But it so happens that from the time of Bracton
down attention has been frequently called by the common-law
courts to the fact that the whole subject of rights in water has
been defined by the civil law writers in terms which substantially
agree with the recognised rules of the common law, ald that they
agree very closely, not necessarily because one has been borrowed
from the other, but rather because both are naturally drawn from
the general usages and necessities of mankind.
All of the considerations which belong to the present case
depend on the reciprocal action on both upper and lower pro:
prietors of the maxim that every man, in the use of his own property, must avoid injuring his neighbor's property as far as possible.
And while the cases cited on the hearing show that courts have
sometimes indulged in sweeping language that, taken independently,
would lead to remarkable results, the facts on which the apparently
conflicting rulings rest greatly narrow their substantial repugnance.
There are, it must be admitted, decisions that cannot possibly be
harmonized; but their number and their force do not equal their
apparent importance. And there is no subject on which local
usages have had so much weight in shaping the local common law
as the incidents of real estate. There are parts of the Union
where the land laws have always differed from the common law of
other states, while the law relating to water has been laid down in
a large part of the United States, in a uniform manner, without
reference to their ancient condition as .French, Spanish or English
colonies. The civil-law definitions, or what are supposed to be
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such, are quoted as often under the one class of antecedents as
under the other.
The chief differences pointed out on'the argument as important
in weighing decisions as furnishing precedents, related to distinctions between living streams in a natural flow and water of a
different character in artificial escapes or in surface descents-to
distinctions between urban and rural servitudes-and to the purposes for which dams or other interruptions are made. It is not
disputed that perennial flowing streams of living water impose
similar duties, and confer similar rights on all riparian proprietors
under all systems of jurisprudence. It is not disputed that under
what is claimed to have been -the civil-law rule, the rural proprietor
of lower lands was required to receive the water flow of surface
water from the upper lands coming in substantially its natural
amount and condition. Beyond this we cannot harmonize much
of the contention of counsel, and must dispose of the case as it
appears to us. A number of the most striking cases cited by plaintiff's counsel in support of his appeal, as laying down the broadest
doctrine, and as relied upon in a good share of his other citations,
were cases where the lands were in towns and cities, and the erections or acts in litigation referred to the uses of that class of
property. And in relying on these it was claimed that there was
no substantial foundation for any distinction between urban and
rural property.
There is no question but that such a distinction is recognised in
the civil-law authorities referred to on the argument, as well as
in several of the cases cited. The distinction is one of substance,
and not arbitrary. As already suggested, the adjoining owners
owe mutual duties-the one to receive the natural flow, and the
other not to injuriously change its conditions. It is obvious that
the laying out of town streets and the multiplication of buildings.
cannot avoid making serious changes in the surface of the ground
and in the condition of surface water. Grades must usually be
established for streets and sidewalks and pavements, and other surface changes are usual, in addition to the walls of buildings, which,
with their embankments, must obstruct or change the drainage. It
is almost universally expected and provided that sewerage and
drainage shall be regulated by some municipal standard. There
cannot be towns without changing the face of the land materially.
And where the same rule has been applied to towns as to the coun-
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try, it has, in some cases, at least, been done expressly because in
the circumstances of the record the particular land in question had
remained under rural conditions. If, as seems to be true, some
decisions ignore the distinction, they depart from the old rule, and
cannot be maintained as harmonious with the general line of
authority, unless on special facts which do not justify their broad
dicta.
The Massachusetts cases lay down so broadly the right of the
lower proprietor to cut off the water flowing down on him, that
whatever distinction may be found in their facts, the court evidently meant to disregard them. The Wisconsin cases perhaps go
about as far, and the Indiana rule is stated in similar termhs. It
can hardly be said that there is any fixed New York rule which
would apply to such a case as the present. In the case of Barkley
v Wilcox, 86 N. Y. 140, where the interference with the water
was by building and banking up a house near a street, the facts did
not call for any very general discussion, and the court, while expressing a preference for the views of the Massachusetts courts over the
rule in Pennsylvania and other states to the contrary, saw the zecessity of caution in adopting those views too universally,' and left the
door open to deal with cases like this on their own footing. In
Bowlsby v. Speer, 2 Vroom (N. J.) 851, the facts and the decision,
were like those in Barkley v. Wilcox, but can hardly be said todisturb the earlier case of Earl v. De Hart, 1 Beasl. 280, where
the civil-law principle was treated as in some cases furnishing a
proper rule for town property which was not so situated as to require
a different treatment.
Mr. Washburn, in his treatise on Easements, p. 355, indicates
that the Massachusetts rule is not sustained by .the weight of American authority, and that the rule known as the civil-law rule has
been more generally accepted. He cites most of the authorities
brought to our attention on the argument, and they unquestionably
sustain the existence of duties between the respective landowners to
do no harm to each other against the natural servitude. Much of
the discussion found in the cases referred to turns, not on the right
of the upper owner to have egress for his water, but upon the
right of the lower owner to have the water come down. In
the present case, Boyd does not seem to desire this supply. But
it is quite supposable that, if this pond were not entirely on his
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premises, it might be of some importance to the neighboring land
that it should not be diminished or destroyed.
It is not necessary on this record to determine how far defendants.could themselves have shut off the supply, because it is evidently
not for their interest to do so. But there is no lack of cases which
hold that rights may exist in a flow of water which is not a natural
living stream. And while here, as in other cases, the rights of
parties must depend somewhat on the circumstances and surroundings, the general principle underlying all the cases is that the
upper and lower owners must respect any valuable rights which
accrue to either from the position of their lands. The narrow definition of water-courses as natural living streams, which appears in
a few cases in the United States, is not an ancient or universal
definition. On the contrary, water running in a natural or artificial bed is very frequently, if not generally, so regarded. But
names are of small importance, inasmuch as the only consideration
that need be looked at is the character and surroundings of the
flowage. The following authorities recognise valuable rights in
water, and some of them are spoken of expressly as watercourses,
which are entirely distinct from natural living streams: Woolr.
Wat. 3, 146, 147; Wright v. Williams, 1 Mees. & W. 77; Rawstron v. Taylor, "11 Exch. 369; Broadbent v. Ramsbotham, Id.
602; Beeston v. Weate, 5 El. & B1. 986 ; Ivimey v. Stocker,
L. R., 1 Ch. App. 396; Watts v. Kelson, L. R., 6 Ch. App.
166; Nuttall v. Bracewell, L. R., 2 Exch. 1; Holer v. Poritt, L. R., 8 Exch. 107; Taylor v. Corp. of St. Helens, 6 Ch.
Div. 264; Magor v. Ohadwick, 11 Ad. & E. 571; Chadwick v.
Marsden, L. R., 2 Exch. 284.
Upon such questions as are raised on this record there is, except
in the Massachusetts doctrine and the cases which have followed it,
very little conflict of opinion. Whatever may be the rights of
adjoining proprietors as to the use and diversion of water, there
is no right in any one, by raising artificial obstructions, to flood
his neighbors' lands by stopping the escape of water that cannot
escape otherwise. Some cases have intimated that there might be
larger rights of obstruction where the particular drainage was not
necessary. But actual mischief done as a natural and necessary
consequence of such erections is almost universally treated as an
actionable nuisance: Lawrence v. Cr. N. Railroad Co., 16 Q. B.
643 ; _Tylands v. Fletcher, L. R., 3 H. L. 330 ; Tootle v. Clifton,
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22 Ohio St. 247; Wood, Nuis. § 886; Hurdman v. . r. Bailroad Co., 3 C.P. Div. 168; Whalley v. Lancashire&Y. Railway
Co., Eng. Ct. App. March 1884, (623 Am. Law. Reg. N. S.) 533;
Brodir v. Saillard, 2 Ch. Div. 692; Gilham v. Madison Co.
Railway Co., 49 Ill. 484; Gormley v. Sanford, 52 Id. 158;
Ogburn v. Connor, 46 Cal. 846; Butler v. Peck, 16 Ohio St.
384; NYevins v. City of Peoria, 41 Ill. 502; Livingston v. M.cDonald, 2i Iowa 160; ifooper v. Wilkinson, 15 La. Ann. 497;
McCormick v. Kansas City Railroad, 70 Mo. 859; Shain v.
Kansas City Railway, 71'Id. 237.
As previously suggested, the rights of upper and lower owners
are' not treated by the common-law authorities as peculiar to either
common or -civil law, but as natural incidents to the land, which are
and must be analogous, as governed by universal jurisprudence,
except where specially modified. 'The English courts have never
hesitated to cite the civilians on such questions, and they have
decided cases arising out of England without attempting to inquire
into any local law as the basis of decision. Thus, in the East
Indian case of Ramesur Pershad.NarainSingh v. Koonj Behari
Pattuk, 4 App. Cas. 121, the rights of the parties were dealt
with just as if they had arisen in England, although the uses of
tanks and reservoirs in, India must, in all probability, have grown
into very ancient customs. In Smith v. Kenrick, 7 C. B. 515,
the Digest was cited as authority. In Dickinson v. Grand Junction Candl Co., 7 Exch. 282, and in -Embrey v. Owen, 6 Exch.
.853, it is stated that these various rights are not to be regarded
as based on any presumption of grants, but as incident to property jure nature.
Bracton is cited in Wood, Nuis. § 886, as coinciding with the
civil-law rule. While he has been regarded as drawing too much
from the Roman law in some other matters, no one has doubted
that he laid down the common law correctly on this. Britton lays
it down very clearly that no one can drown his neighbor's land by
erections on his own soil. "Appurtenances," fol. 140. The'civillaw rule was recognised and adopted in the customary as well as in
the written law, in parts of France, and in Canada and Scotland;
and the Roman law in all these regions was modified by local usage,
and in many things repudiated. In Basuage's Commentary on the
Customs of Normandy it is not treated as a civil-law rule, but as a
law of nature. 2 Basuage 565. In Pr.echette v. La Compagnie
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Aanufacturiere de St. Hyacinthe, L. R., 9 App. Cas. 170, the
Lower Canada Code is quoted, which seems to be a substantial if
not a literal transcript of section 640 of the French Civil Code, and
regulates the rights of both classes of owners, forbidding the lower
owner from hindering the escape of water by dykes, and forbidding
the upper owner from aggravating the flow to the injury of the
lower estate. In discussing this clause, a learned writer on the law
of property, Charles Compte, speaks of the term "servitude,"
which strictly denotes a diminution of rights, as an unfortunate and
improper phrase to apply to these reciprocal duties." " It is simply
a means of preventing usurpation, and of securing to each that
which belongs to him." While Erskine, in his "Principles of the
Law of Scotland," uses the term "servitude" as including the rights
in question, 'he speaks of them as natural, as contradistinguished
from legal servitudes. Book 2, tit. 9. Domat refers to them in
the same way, dividing servitudes into those which are natural, and
those which do not rest on natural right. Bo'ok 1, tit. 12, § 5.
And this is further illustrated by his collection of excerpts from
the Roman law. 4 Domat, 423.
There seems to be no reason for attempting to draw distinctions
between the civil and the common law on this subject. The authorities recognise the principles as in no sense conventional, or derived
from any school of jurisprudence, but as resting on the immunity
of one man's property from injury by another in violation of natural
justice, and in disregard of the relative conditions arising from its
position. Each may do in using his own what is consistent with
the fair interests of the other.
The escape of water in the present case is natural and is necessary, and there was no right to prevent it by such a dam as defend'ants broke through. The charge given was at least as liberal as
plaintiff had a right to ask. The judgment should be affirmed.
CHAMPLIN
COOLEY,

and

SHERWOOD,

JJ., concurred.

C. J., did not sit.

DEFiNITION OF A STREAM.-Before

discussing the subject of "surfacewater," it is well to have a clear understanding what is meant by the use of that
term. It is clear that surface-water is
not a watercourse, and' with that it
is most likely to be confounded,
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In Luther v. Winnisimmet, 9 Cush. 174,
a'watercourse is defined as "a stream
of water, usually flowing in a definite
channel, having a bed and sides or banks,
and usually discharging itself into some
other stream or body of water." "A
watercourse consists of bed, banks and-
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water; yet the water need not flow continually; and there are many watercourses which are sometimes dry:"
Fryer v. Warne, 29 Wis. 515 ; see Eulrich v. Richter, 41 Wis. 318. In Indiana, after defining a watercourse in the
language given, the court said: "There
must, however, always be substantial indication of the existence of a stream,
which is ordinarily and most frequently
a moving body of water:" Weis v. City
Madison, 75 Ind. 253.
of In
New Jersey it was said: "A
channel or canal for the conveyance of water,
particularly in draining lands. It may
be natural, as when it is made by the
natural flow of the water, caused by the
general superficies of the surrounding
land from which the water is collected
into one channel, or it may be artificial,
as in the case of a ditch, or other artificial means, used to divert the water from
its natural channel, or to carry it from low
lands,.from which it will not flow in consequence of the natural formation of the
surface of the surrounding land." Earl
v. De Hart, 1 Beasley Ch. 283.
Ex. mPL.-From time immemorial a
natural stream of water had flowed from
a southerly direction across a road and
upon the defendant's land, and thence
taking a- northwesterly course. A part
of the way across the defendant's land it
ran in a well-defined channel, but when
it reached a point within five rods of the
plaintiff's adjoining land, the water
spread out over the surface of the ground,
covering a space a few rods in width,
and so ran upon and across the plaintiff's
laud, which was a level meadow, and
irrigating it in a valuable manner.
through its whole length, about seven
rods, and thence on to other land of other
owners beyond. Over the surface of the
defendant's land there was no defined
channel, nor through the whole length
of the plrintiff's land, and not until a
short distance beyond the plaintiff's land,
where it again formed a small brook, and
ran off in a westerly direction to a river.

In an action by the plaintiff for diverting
this brook from his land, it was held,
"that the brook did not cease to be a
natural watercourse on the plaintiff's
land, and that he could maintain the
action :" Macomber v. Godfrey, 108
Mass. 219. For further example, see
Gillett v. Johnson, 30 Conn. 180; Barkley
*. Milcox, 86 N. Y. 140 ; s. c. 40 Am.
Rep. 519; Little Rock, etc., Ry. Co. v.
Chapmnan, 39 Ark. 463; s. c. 43 Am.
Rep. 280: Hebron Grarel Road Co. v.
Harvey, 90 Ind. 192.
Two LiKEs oi' CsEs.-As indicated
in the principal case, there are two lines
of cases, following two distinct rules :
the common-law rule and the civil-law
rule.
THE COMMON-LAw RULE .- The leading case asserting the common-law rule
is Luther v. Winnisimet, 9 Cash. 171
In that case the defendant
(1851).
caused an additional flow of water upon
the plaintiff's land, by filling up his own
lot. The court charged the jury " that,
if there was a watercourse or stream of
water running through the land conveyed, the right to the continued flow
thereof would pass to the plaintiff under
the deed, as a parcel of his grant; that if
there was no such watercourse or stream
of water the plaintiff could not claim a
right of drainage or flow of water from
off his land upon and through the defendant's land, merely because the plaintiff's
land was higher than the defendant's,
and sloped toward it, so that the water
which fell in rain upon it would naturally
ru over the surface in that direction ;"
and the chargd was held strictly correct.
In a New York case is a dictum which
has been cited so often, and its statements
so unqualifiedly endorsed, that it now
I
has all the weight of an authority: " A
fortiori one is not obliged to excavate
ditches or construct sewers on his own
land for the purpose of draining the low
or marshy lands of an adjoining proprietor. And in respect to the running
off of surface-water by rain or snow, I

BOYD v. CONKLIN.
know of no principle which will prevent
the owner of land from filling up the wet
and marshy place on his own soil for its
amblioration and his own advantage,
because his neighbor's land is so situated
as to be incommoded by it. Such a doctrine would militate against the wellsettled rule that the owner of land has
full dominion over the whole space above
and below the surface:" Goodale v.
Tuttle, 29 N. Y. 459, 466.
In another Massachusetts case it was
said: "the right of an owner of land to
occupy and improve it in such manner and
for such purposes as he may see fit,
either by changing the surface, or the
erection of buildings or other structures
thereon, is not restricted or modified by
the fact that his own land is so situated
with reference to that of adjoining owners
that an alteration in the mode of its improvement or occupation in any portion
of it will cause water, which may accumulate thereon by rains and snows falling on its surface, or flowing upon it
over the surface of adjacent lots, either
to stand in unusual quantities on other
adjacent lands, or pass into or over the
same in greater quantities or in other
direction than they were accustomed to
flow."
Again: "the obstruction of
surface-water or an alteration in the flow
of it affords no cause of action in behalf
of a person who may suffer loss or detriment therefrom against one who does no
act inconsistent with the due exercise of
dominion over his own soil" : Gannon
v. Hargadon, 10 Allen 106.
It, therefore, follows from the reasoning of these eases-which is sustained by many authorities-that the
owner of land may lawfully occupy and
improve it in such manner as either to
prevent water which accumulates elsewhere from coming upon it, as by erect-ing a wall, dyke or barrier, or to alter
the course of the surface-water which
falls upon it, or comes upon it from elsewhere; even though water is thereby
made to flow upon the adjoining land of

another to his damage: Bates v. Smith,
100 Mass. 181 ; Bowlsby v. Speer, 31
N. J. L. 351 ; Greatrex v. Hayward,*8
Exch. 291 ; Sdelds v. Arndt, 3 Green
Ch. 234 ; Barkley v. Wilcox, 86 N. Y.
140; s. c. 40 Am. Rep. 519; Vanderwide v. Taylor, 65 N. Y. 341; Lynch v.
Mayor, etc., 76 Id. 60; s. C. 32
Am. Rep. 271; s. c. 38 Id. 753;
s. c. 5Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 82;
Cairo -Vincennes Rd. Co. v. Stevens, 73
Ind. 278 ; s. c. 38 4m. Rep. 139 ; s. c.
5 Am. &Enog. R. R. Cas. 58 ; Beard v.
Murphy, 37 Vt. 104 ; BuftamV. Barris,
5 R. I. 253; Wadsworth v. Tillotson, 15
Conn. 366 ; Atchinson, 4-c., Rd. Co. v.
Hammer, 22 Kan. 763; s. c. 31 Am.
Rep. 216; Schlichter v. Phillipy, 67
Ind. 201 ; Hogenson v. St. Paul, 4-c.,
Ry. Co., 31 Minn. 224; see O'Brien v.
City of St. Paul, 25 Minn. 331.
So a complaint charging the obstruction of a watercourse is not sustained
by proof of a flow, though through a
ditch, of water which has accumulated
from rains or melting snow : Dickinson
V. Worcester, 7 Allen 19; Ashley v.
Wolcott, 11 Cush. 192; Afumkres v.
Kansas City, 4-c., Rd. Co., 60 Mo. 334.
The owner of land adjoining a highway may throw up an embankment to
prevent the water overflowing his premises where it comes from such highway.
Thus where a highway had been laid out
for forty years, up a steep hill-side, over
which large quantities of surface-water
usually flowed down on the upper side
of the highway; and a culvert was built
by the proper authorities across the highway, extending to the inside of the wall
between the highway and the defendant's land, a portion of the wall having
been removed for that purpose; and a
light trenchwas dug from the mouth of the
culvert, two or three feet in length, into
defendant's land to carry the water off,
it was held that the defendant might stop
up so much of the culvert as was under
his wall, even though it had the effect to
cause the water to flow over the highway
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and injure the travelled road: Inhabitants oJ Franklin v. Fsk, 13 Allen 211.
In case of a railway corporation taking
land for a right of way, it is held that it
is proper to take into consideration the
lay of the land and the flow of water in
percolating through the land : .eger v.
Hastinqs and Dakota Railroad Co., 5
Amer. & Eng. Railroad Cases 85;
Waterman v. Conn. R. Railroad Co., 30
Vt. 610. See Mforrison v. Bucksport
Railroad Co., 67 Me. 353. See, also,
Walker v. Old Colony and Neuport
Railroad Co., 103 MIass. 10. So, in
New York, it is held that commissioners
in grading highways are not bound to
provide a channel for drainage of surface-water: Gould v. Booth, 66 N.

DeHart, I Bcasl. 280. Yet, in Kansas,
the contrary seems to have been held :
Gibbs v. Williams, 25 Kans. 210. See
Barnes v. Sabron, 10 Nev. 218; Hoyt
Hudson, 27 Wis. 656.
Frequently the question arises whether
the owner of the upper land acquires any
right by prescription or adverse use to
flood his neighbor's lower and adjoining
land. In Massachusetts it was held that
no period less than twenty years would
give the owner of the upper land any
right to flood the land of the lower
owner, both having derived title from
the same grantor : Luther v. Winnisimmet, 9 Cash. 171. See Earl v. DeHart,
supra. However, merely permitting
water to flow from the upper to the
Y. 62.
lower land, when the two pieces are
The owner of the upper land may owned by different owners, is not sufdrain off the surface-water into an ad- ficient to create a right to the continuajoining stream, even though it may tion of the flowage by prescription or
increase the flow: Il'affe v. N. Y. adverse usage. See 2 Am. L. Reg.
Cent. Railroad Co., 58 Barb. 413, if
(N. S.) 72; Prescott v. White, 21
such increase is reasonable : fcCormick Pick. 342 (ditch); Wood v. lWaud, 3
v. Horan, 81 N. Y. 86; s. a. 479 Am. Exch. 778 ; Greatrixv. Haywood, 8 1d.
Rep. 47.
291 ; Arkwright v. Bell, 5 M. & W. 203;
So one may drain off his land even Rawstron v. Taylor, 11 Exch. 369;
though it have the effect to reduce the Parks v. Newburyport, 10 Gray 29 ;
supply of a stream wherea mill is situ- Fryer v. Warne, 29 Wis. 511 ; Dickinated: Broadbent v. Bamsbotham, 11 son v. Morcester, 7 Allen 19 ; White v.
Exch. 602; Rawstron v. Trylor, .Id. Chapin, 12 Id. 516, 518.
369. And the same is true of water
Suppose the surface-water is drained
percolating through soil beneath its sur- off or backed up with a malicious design
face: Chasemore v. Richards, 7 H. L. to injure an adjoining owner, is there a
374; s. c. 5 Jur. (N. S.) 873; 5 H.
liability incurred by reason of such
& N. 990 (Am. ed.). One cannot, design ? If it is done under an abso.
however, foul the surface-water flowing lute claim of right and in good faith,
over his land to another's: Gawtry v. under the common law no liability atLdand, 31 N. J. Eq. 385; and the taches: Hoyt v. Hudon, 27 Wis. 656;
same is true of water percolating be- s. c. 9 Am. Rep. 473; Pettigrew Y.
neath the surface of the soil : Hodg- E.vans,ille, 25 Wis. 223, 230; Adams
kinson v. Ennor, 9 Jur. (N. S.) 1152. v. Walker, 34 Conn. 466; Greenleaj v.
See Brown v. Rllims, 25 Conn. 583.
Francis, 18 Pick. 121 ; Wheatley v.
Water flowing from a hollow or Bough, 25 Penn. St. 528; Delhi v. Gouravine, only in time of rain or melting mont, 50 Barb. 316-: Panton v. Holland,
snows, it has been held in New York, is 17 Johns. 92, 98; Chasemore v. Richards,
not, in contemplation of law, a water- 5 Jur. N. S. 873 ; s.'c. 5 H. & N. 990;
course: Wagner v. Long Island Rail- 7 H. L. 349. Yet it has been decided
road Co., 2 Hun 633. See Earl v. that iAis immaterial with what motive an
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act is done, if it is otherwise lawful.
Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49 ; see also
Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294 ;
Clinton v. Mlfyers, 46 N. Y. 511 ; Heald
v. -Carey, 11 C. B. 993: Brainy. Marfell, 41 Law Times N. S., note; Walker
Cronin, 107 Mass. 555 ; Cooley on Torts
688.
In Curtiss v. JAyrault, 47 N. Y. 73,
the owner of a tract of land, upon which
was a swamp, dug a ditch from it through
another portion of the tract, making a
permanent channel, in which the waters
gathering in the marsh flowed in a continuous stream, mutually benefiting the
lands drained, and the lands to which
it conveyed a supply of good water,
and, subsequently, while those reciprocal
benefits and burdens existed, and were
apparent, he divided the tract into
parcels and conveyed the parcels to different grantees, who contracted with reference to the condition of the lands. After
the sale of several parcels, it was held
that the vendor could not change the
ditch in any way, or refuse to permit
the water to flow in the ditch, nor could
the grantees in any way materially change
the original relative condition of one parcel to the injury of another.
EX PLES.-The owner of a tract of
land sued an adjoining owner for obstructing the passage of driftwood carried
by the overflow of an adjacent watercourse during a freshet, by planting a
row of trees along the line dividing their
lands, by means of which the driftwood
was lodged upon the plaintiff's land. It
was held that he had no cause of action:
Taylor v. 1Fickas, 64 Ind. 167 ; s. c.
31 Amer. Rep. 114; 18 Am. Law Reg.
(N. S.) 249,
A railroad corporation built a large
embankment ten feet high, upon which to
lay its tracks along its right of way, running across a low and swampy tract of
land, and the embankment cut off the
natural flow of the water percolating
through the soil, and the flow of the
water that came from a river, not far off,

in times of high water. The water fall.
ing upon the plaintiff's land, which lay
some distance above the embankment,
and that caused by the melting snow, was
prevented from flowing off by reason of
the water being heaped up on the land
adjoining the embankment. It was held
that the corporation was not liable to the
plaintiff, by rehson of his lands having
been rendered unfit for cultivation, even
through it was alleged that the plaintiff
had lost several crops for that reason, and
had sustained great damages which proper
culverts placed under the embankment
would have prevented : Cairo and Vincennes Rd. v. Stevens, 73 Ind. 278 ; see
Morrison v. Bucksport and Bangor Rd.
Co., 67 Ale. 353 ; Atchison, 4c., Rd. Co.
v. -I.anmer,22 Kans. 763.
Plaintiff's field lay in an angle made
by a railway crossing a highway. Previous to the construction of the railway
the water falling upon the highway ran
down the road, across where the railway
was located, and thus running caused no
injury to the plaintiff's land. After its
construction the water, prevented by the
embankment from flowing off, accumulated at the crossing and flowed back
upon the land of the plaintiff. It was
held that no cause of action lay against
the railway corporation: Wagner v. Long
Island Rd. Co., 2 Hun 633 ; see TWaffe
v. N. Y. Cent. Rd. Co., 58 Barb. 413.
A railroad corporation, in constructing
'the road-bed, filled up an artificial ditch
on the land of a third person, by which
the surface-water was conducted from the
plaintiff's premises to a river, and thus
turned back the water upon the premises
of such person. It was held to give no
ground of action: O'Conner v. Fond du
Lac, etc., Rd. Co., 52 Wis. 526 ; s. c.
38 Amer. Rep. 753; 5 Amer. & Eng.
Rd. Cas. 82.
T~u CIvIL LAw RULE.-Of this rule
Justice REDFIELI has said : I There
seems to be nothing very definite in the
civil-law writers upon this particular
point, except that it is fully agreed in the
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body of the Roman law (Dig. lib. 89,
tit. iii. s. 12), that if one by digging on
his own land, in good faith, and with no
purpose of injuring his neighbor, nevertheless dry up his well by diverting the
underground current from it, there is no
remedy by action. * * * But the
distinction between surface-water, accumulating in low places from the melting
of snows in the spring, and that.which
had formed more or lees permanent channels in the earth in its passage, would
not be likely to attract the attention of
writers in most of the European countries, and especially in Italy, where no
snows ever cover the ground :" I1Amer.
L. Reg. p. 20.
DOMAT says (page 616 Cush. ed.):
£Rainwater or other waters which have
their course regulated from one ground
to another, whether it be by nature, or
by some regulation, or by title, or by
ancient possession, the proprietor of said
grounds cannot innovate anything, as to
the ancient course of its waters ; thus he
who has the upper grounds cannot change.
the course of the water, either by turning
it some other way or rendering it more
rapid, or making any other change in it
to the prejudice of the owners of the
lower grounds."
One of the leading cases following this
rule is Martin v. Riddle, reported in a
note to Kauffman v. Griesemer, 26 Pa.
St. 407, where the law is very well
stated: " Where two fields adjoin, and
one is lower than the other, the lower
must necessarily be subject to all the
natural flow of water from the upper
one. The inconvenience arises from its
position, and is usually more than compensated by other circumstances ; hence,
the owner of the lower ground has no
right to erect embankments, whereby the
natural flow of water from the upper
ground shall be stopped; nor has the
owner of the upper ground a right to
make any excavations or drains by
which the flow of water is diverted from
its natural channel and a new channel

made on the lower ground ; nor can he
collect into one channel water usually
flowing off into his neighbor's fields by
several channels, and thus increase the
waste upon the lower fields."
A number of states have adopted this
rule: Nininger v. Norwood, 72 Ala.
277 ; s.c. 47 Amer. Rep. 412; Hughes
v. Anderson, 68 Ala. 280; s. c. 44
Amer. Rep. 147; Gilham v. Madison
County Railroad Co., 49 Ill.
484 ; Gonley v. Sanford, 52 Id. 158 ; Toledo, .6c.,
Railroad Co. v. Morrison; 71 Id. 616 ;
St. Louis, 4-c., Railroad Co. v. Capps,
72 Id. 188; Jacksonville, 6-c., Railroad
Co. v. Cox, 91 Id. 500; Ogburn v.
Connor, 46 Cal. 346 ; s. c. 13 Amer.
Rep. 213; Butler v. Peck, 16 Ohio. St.
334; Tootle f/.
Clifton, 22 Id. 247 ; s.
c. 10 Amer. Rep. 732 ; Miller v. Laubach, 47 Pa. St. 154; Martin v. zit
12 La. 502, Lattimore v. Davis, 14 Id.
161; Delahousaye v. Judice, 13 La.
Ann. 587; 31inor v. Wright, 16 Id.
151; Orerton v. Sawyer, I Jones L.
(N. C.) 308; Porter v. Durham, 74
N. C. 769. See Raleigh, 6-c., Railroad
Co. v. Wicker, 74 Id. 220; Livingston
v. McDonald, 21 Iowa 160 (a leading
case) ; Van Orsdol v. Burlington, 4-c.,
Railroad Co., 56 Id. 470 ; s. c. 5
Amer. & Eng. Railroad Cases 53;
Herrington v. Peck, 11 Bradw. 62;
Hicks v. Silliman, 93 II. 255 ; Ludeling
v. Stubbs, 34 La..A:n. 935 ; Guesnard
v. Bird, 33 Id. 796 ; Barrow v. Landry,
15 Id. 681 ; Louisville, 4-c., Railroad
Co. v. Hays, 11 Lea (Tenn.) 382;
Executor of Lord v. CarbonIron Manuf.
Co., 38 N. J. Eq. 452.
An injunction to enjoin the throwing
up of an embankment so as to prevent
the natural flow of the surface-water, will
be refused ; because the plaintiff has his
right of action at law: Luney v. Jasper,
39 11. 46.
But the plaintiff is not estopped by
his deed of grant of way to a railroad
company, from bringing a suit for damages in obstructing the surface-water:
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.Tarksontilfle, 4c., Railroad Co. v. Cox,
91 Il. 500.
In Livingston v. McDonald, 21 Iowa
160, it was held, "that the owner of the
higher land had an unqualified right
to drain for agricultural purposes the
sur.'ace-water, or water flowing in no
regular or definite channel upon his own
lands, and is not liable to an action by the
lower proprietor for so draining as to
prevent any portion of those waters
reaching the land of the lower owner ;"
but " the owner of the higher land has
no right, even in the course of the use
and improvement of his farm, to collect
the surface-water upon his own lands
into a drain or ditch, increased in
quantity or in manner different from
the natural flow, upon the lower lands
of another, to the injury of such lands."
The last part of this proposition is the
rule of the civil law ; and the first part
is not in contravention of the common
law.
Ex.A PEs.-Astream ran through the
plaintiff's land. In times of heavy rains
large quantities of water escaped over
the banks of this stream upon the plaintiff's lands, and with the accumulations
of rainwater, had a natural outlet therefrom over the lands of the defendants.
To prevent these-waters from flowing
over and flooding their lands, the defendants erected embankments upon the
plaintiff's lands, rendering them less fit
for cultivation, and in other respects injuring them. It was held that an injunction to restrain the defendants preventing the water from flowing was rightly
granted: Ninfnger v. Norwood, 72 Ala.
277 ; s.c. 47 Amer. Rep. 412.
The plaintiff and defendant were coterminous land-holders, each engaged
in agriculture, the former owning the inferior, and the latter the superior heritage.
Through the plaintiff's lands, and near
the dividing line, flowed a natural stream
or branch, which was the natural outlet
for a part, at least, of the water, which
fell on defendant's land. The water
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flowed naturally from the defendant's
land upon the plaintiff's land, and across
a portion of it into the stream. It flowed
slowly, not in a collected body, but scattered over the surface. In its natural
state, part of the water was absorbed,
and part evaporated before it reached the
lands of the plaintiff. By means of
ditches, the defendant collected all this
surface-water into one channel, thereby
draining his own lands and causing the
water to flow much more rapidly, and in
one body, into the branch on the plaintiff's lands. This emptied the water off
the defendant's land much sooner, and as
a consequence, precipitated it much more
rapidly, and in increased volume on the
plaintiff's land, thereby flooding a portion of his lands, and rendering them uncultivable. It was ruled that the "defendant had no right, by ditches or
otherwise, to cause water to flow on the
lands of the plaintiff, which, ir the
absence of such ditches, would have
flowed in a different direction. As to
the water theretofore accustomed to flow
on the lands of the plaintiff, the defendant was not bound to remain inactive.
He was permitted to so ditch his own
lands, or to drain them, provided he did
so with a prudent regard to the welfare
of his neighbor, and provided he did no
more than concentrate the water, and
cause it to flow more rapidly, and in
greater volume on the inferior heritage.
This, however, must be weighed and decided with a proper reference to the value
and necessity of the improvement to the
superior heritage, contrasted with the
injury to the inferior; and even the license must be conceded with great
caution and prudence. It is a question
for the jury to determine, on the facts
of each particular case, under proper
instructions from the court:" Hughes
v. Anderson, 68 Ala. 280; a. o. 44
Amer. Rep. 147.
MissouRi CAss.-The Missouri cases
are in. much confusion, first following the
civil law: Lumier v. Francis, 23 Mo.
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announce the most just and equitabla
rule.
DOCTEIxE APPLICABLE TO BOA
Rui~xs.-All the cases agree, however,
whatever rule they may pursue, that one
adjoining landowner cannot gather surface-water into a body and discharge it in
a mass or body upon his neighbor's land.
Such is the recent English case of Whalley
v. Lancashire, 4-c., Ry. Co., 23 Am. L.
Reg. 635 ; s. c. 5 0 L. T. 472 ; Weis v.
Madison, 75 Ind. 241 ; Gillison v.
Charleston, 16 W. Va. 282 ; Rylandt
v. FPetcher, L. B., 3 E. & I. Ap. Cas.
Nzw HAmrsmR RuLE.-The New 330; Templeton v. Vashoe, 72 Ind. 134 ;
Hampshire court pursues a middle Tootlev. Clijon, 22 Ohio St. 24 7; s. o.
course, it would seem, between the two 10 Am. Rep. 732; Ogburn v. Connor,
accepted rules. In Bassett v. Salisbury 46 Cal. 346 ; s. c. 13 Am. Rep. 213.
Manf. Co., 43 N. H. 569; 28 Id.
Nor can the owner of the upper land
438; 3 Am. L. Reg. 223, it was held lawfully discharge the waters of a
in respect to water percolating through natural pond or reservoir of surfacethe soil that the landowner's right to ob- water through an artificial channel distruct or divert it is limited to what is rectly over the land of another: Pettinecessary in the reasonable use of his grew v. Evansville, 25 Wis. 223 ; s. c.
own land. In Sweet v. Cutts, 50 N. 3 Am. Rep. 50 ; Livinjqston v. McDonH. 439; s. c. 11 Am. L. Reg. 11, the ald, 21 Iowa 160, (an under-ground
same rule was applied to surface-water. ditch) ; Foot v. Bronson, 4 Lans. 47 ;
In Vermont a rule not very dissimilar nor from springs: Curtis v. Eastern Rd.
from the New Hampshire rule was fol- Co., 98 Mass. 428: even though it flow
lowed: Beard v. Murphy, 37 Vt. 99;
naturally that way: McCormick, 4-c.,
Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Id. 49.
Rd. Co., 70 Mo. 359; . c. 35 Am.
The principal case does not differ Rep. 431; Gillisony. Charleston, 16W.
greatly from the rule of these last three Va. 282.
W. W. THoRNToN.
cases; and, perhaps, on the whole, they
Crawfordsville, Ind.
181; Shane v. Kansas City, 4-c., Rd.
Co., 71 Id. 237; s. C. 36 Am. Rep.
479; 5 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 64.
Other cases seem to follow the commonlaw rule: Murnkers v. Kansas City, 4-c.,
Rd. Co., 72 Mo. 514; s. c. 5 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 79 ; McCormick v. Kansas City, #-c., Rd. Co., 70 le. 359 ;
Jones v. Hannovan, 55 Id. 462; McCormick v. Kansas City, 4-c., Rd. Co., 57
Id. 433. In the latest case the court
swings back to the civil-law rule: Benson v. Chicago 4- Alton Rd. Co., 78 Mo.
504.

Supreme Court of California.
HART v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY.
A telegraph company is liable for whatever loss naturally and in the usual course
of things follows from its failure to transmit a message promptly and correctly,
although such message was written in cipher, or was otherwise unintelligible to the
company.
A stipulation printed on a blank upon which a telegraph message is sent, purporting to exempt the telegraph company from all liability for mistakes or delays in the
transmission or delivery, or for non-delivery of any unrepeated message, whether
happening by the negligence of its servants or otherwise, beyond the amount received
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for sending the same, is void for want of consideration. Such company cannot stipulate against or limit its liability for mistakes happening in consequence of its owi
fault, such as want of proper skill ot ordinary care on the part of its operators, or
the use of defective instruments. Such company is exempt only for errors arising
from causes beyond its control, and the burden of showing such exemption rests
upon it, in an action to recover for an alleged loss.
A telegraph company is not liable for a loss arising from a mistake in the transmission of a message, when such mistake was occasioned by a break in the electric
current, produced by atmospheric influences beyond the company's control.

THE opinion of the court was delivered by
Ross, J.-On the 15th day of December 1882, the plaintiff
delivered to the defendant, at its*Stockton office this message:
"-'George W. McNear, San Francisco:-Buy bail barley falun;
report by mail.
GEORGE HART."
The message was promptly transmitted and delivered as written,
except that the word " bail" was changed to the word "bain."
By the private cipher code of McNear, used by the plaintiff in the
message, the word "bail" means "one hundred tons," and the word
"bain" means" two hundred and twenty-five tons." As the message wis delivered it directed MoNear to buy for the account of the
plaintiff two hundred and twenty-five tons of barley, whereas as it
was written by the plaintiff, McNear was directed to buy on plaintiff's account one hundred tons only. Acting on the message
received, McNear bought for plaintiff two hundred tons of barley.
When the plaintiff discovered 'that fact he notified the defendant
that one hundred tons had been bought in excess of that directed
to be bought by the original message, and asked the defendant what
he should do with the surplus so purchased. Defendant refused to
give any instruction in regard to it. Plaintiff thereupon sold the
barley at the highest market rate, his loss on the extra one hundred
tons being $429.82. It is for the loss thus sustained by him that
the action is brought.
At the trial the only proof given by the plaintiff to show negligence on the part of the defendant was the admitted fact that the
message was delivered in its altered form. It was also admijted
that the message was written by the plaintiff, upon a printed form
prepared by the defendant, underneath the words "send the following message, subject to the above terms, which are hereby agreed
to," and that among the "above terms" referred to are the following: "1To guard against mistakes or delays, the sender of a message
should order it repeated; that is, telegraphed back to the originating
VOL. XXX I.-41
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office for comparison. For this, one-half the regular rate is charged
in addition. It is agreed between the sender of the following message and this company, that said company shall not. be liable for
mistakes or delays in the transmission or delivery, or for non-delivery of any unrepeated message, whether happening by negligence
of its servants or otherwise, beyond the amount received for sending
the same; nor for mistakes or delays in the transmission or delivery,
or for non-delivery of any repeated message beyond fifty times the
sum received for sending the same, unless specially insured; nor
in any case for delays arising from unavoidable interruptions in
the working of its lines, or for errors in cipher or obscure messages."
That the message in question was not "repeated" is conceded
by the plaintiff. It further appears in the case that no explanation
of the meaning of the dispatch was made by the plaintiff at the time
he delivered it to the defendant, for which reason, and because, as
is claimed, the message under consideration was in cipher, appellant contends that the measure of damages is the price paid for the
transmission of the telegram--rin this case, thirty cents. In support of this point it is said by counsel that "the decisions of all the
courts uniformly declare that unless the importance of the message
is shown either by its own terms or by explanation made to the
person receiving it in behalf of the telegraph company, no damages
are recoverable for failure or delay in transmission beyond the
price paid for that purpose."
In this appellant's counsel is mistaken. The cases cited by him
undoubtedly sustain the point he makes, and there are other cases
to the same effect. Some of th6se decisions were based on messages which were in cipher, and others, messages which, though
not in cipher, did not themselves disclose the extent or import of
any transaction had in contemplation by the parties. In those
cases substantial damages were refused because neither the messages nor other information given made known to the operator
what was contemplated. Hence, it was ruled that plaintiff could
not recover of the telegraph company what, not understanding, it
could not have contemplated as the effect of a miscarriage or other
failure.
While not doubting the general rule that damages must be such
as may be fairly supposed to have entered into the contemplation
of the parties when they made the contract; that is, such as might
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be naturally expected to follow its violation, we do question and
think not sound the application of that rule as made in the class
of cases to which allusion is above made.
Telegraph companies have conferred upon them by law certain
privileges, among them the right of eminent domain, and they are
charged with certain duties, among them the obligation to send
promptly and correctly such messages as are intrusted to them.
Of course, if illegibly written, the operator may reject a message;
but if plainly written, his duty is to send it as written. Why has
he the right to know what the message refers to?. In what way
would such knowledge aid him in the discharge of his duty to send
it correctly ? "One of the great attractions," say Scott and Jarnagin, in their treatise on the law of telegraphs, § 404, "which
this mode of communication presents, is the brevity of the dispatch;
such abbreviations being used in many cases as will enable the
person for whom it is intended alone to understand it; and, hence,
the vast amount of business the telegraph operator is capable of
transacting in the transmission and delivery of messages. So that
an explanation of the meaning, importance and bearing of each
message would be an insufferable annoyance, and, in the multiplicity of messages delivered for transmission, could not be remembered, even if the time could be spared to listen to it; and it would
rarely afford any benefit or advantage to the company after the
Proceeding, these writers say,
information was communicated."
and say correctly, that though the company, through its agents,
may not know the meaning of the particular message, they do know
that messages of great value and importance, involving heavy losses
in each case of failure, or delay, or mistake in their transmission,
are constantly sent over their wires; and they do know that they
hold themselves out to the public as prepared at all times and for
all persons, to transmit messages of this description. And the rule
of damages, as applied to telegraph companies, is there deduced,
which we think the true rule, namely, that, although the message
be unintelligible to the company, yet as its undertaking -was to
transmit the message promptly and correctly, both parties contemplated that, whatever loss should naturally, and in the usual course
of things, follow a violation of that obligation, the company should
be responsible for. The same conclusion was reached by the
Supreme-Court of Alabama in the case entitled Doughtry v. ne
American Union Telegraph Company, decided in December 1883,
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a note of which will be found at page 731, 46 American Reports,
and by the Court of Appeals of Virginia in the case of the We8tern
Union Telegraph Company v. Beynolds, 77 Va. 173. See, also,
Rittenhouse v. The Independent Line of Telegraph, 1 Daly 474.
It is also contended on behalf of the defendant corporation that
as the message in question was not "repeated," defendant is not
responsible under any circumstances beyond the amount received for
its transmission; and this because it is so declared in the conditions
printed at the head of the form upon which the dispatch was written,
and to which, as is claimed, the plaintiff assented. There are
numerous cases that hold that such a rule on the part of the company is reasonable, valid and binding on the sender of the message.
The cases that so hold are too numerous to be here referred to in
detail. They will be found collated in a note to the case of the
Western Union Telegraph Company v. Blanchard, reported in 45
American Reports, page 486. But there are many cases to the
contrary, and the latter class we think based on the better reason.
In the first place we agree with the Supreme Court of Illinois
in the case of Tyler v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 68
Ill. 421, and s. c. 74 Ill. 170, where it is held that the regulation
requiring messages to be repeated is not a contract binding in law,
for the reason that the law imposed upon the company duties to be
performed, for the performance of which it was entitled to a compensation fixed by itself, and which the sender had no choice but
to pay ; that among those duties was that of transmitting messages
correctly; that the tariff paid was the consideration for the performance of this duty in each particular case, and when the charges
were paid the duty of the compafiy began, and there wasi therefore, no consideration for the supposed contract requiring the sender
to repeat the message at an additional cost of fifty per cent. of the
original charge. To the same effect is Bartlett v. Western Uhnion
Telegraph Company, 62 Me. 218, and Candee against the same
company, 34 Wis. 477, where the court say: "Aside from the
objections resting on grounds of public policy, and which forbid
the company from stipulating for immunity from the consequences
of its own wrongful acts, it seems very clear to us that there can
be no consideration for such stipulation on the part of the sender
of the message, and that, so far as he is concerned, it is void for
that reason, although exacted by the company and fully assented
to by him. Either the company enters into a contract with him,
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and takes upon itself the burden of some sort of legal obligation to
send the message, or it does not. It would be manifestly against
reason and what all must assume to be the intention of the parties,
to say that no contract whatever is made between them, and nobody,
not even the officers or representatives of the company, asserts such
a doctrine. It would seem utterly absurd to assert it. Holding
itself out as ready and willing and able to perform the service for
whosoever comes and pays the consideration itself had fixed and
declared to be sufficient, and actually receiving such consideration,
it cannot be denied, we think, that a legal obligation arises and
duty exists on the part of the company to transmit the message
with reasonable care and diligence, according to the request of the
sender. Such being the attitude of the company, and the obligation which it assumes by accepting the payment, the question
arising is, whether it can at the same time, and as a part of the
very act of creating the obligation, exact and receive from the other
party to the contract a release from it. The regulations under
consideration, if looked upon as reasonable and valid, completely
nullify The contract by absolving the company from all obligation
to perform it, and the party delivering the message gets nothing in
return for the price of transmission paid by him. Is it possible
for the company, or for any other party entering into a contract for
a valuable consideration received, to promise and not to promise,
or to create and not to create an obligation or duty, at one and the
same moment and by one and the same act? The inconsistency
and impossibility of such things are obvious. But if there were no
such difficulties, or if the occasion or circumstances were such that
a valid release might be executed, and it be regarded in that light,
still the objection exists that there is no consideration whatever to
support it, and it must be held void on that ground. If it be urged
that the sender receives his consideration in the reduced price of
transmission, or because the company undertakes to send the message at one-half the usual rate of transmitting day messages, that
argument ends in proving that the company does not undertake to
send the message at all, and that no contract or agreement on its
part is made or entered into for that purpose. If the company
promises or binds itself at all for the rate or consideration named,
and which it is willing to and does accept, then the smallness of
such consideration cannot operate to relieve from the promise or
to destroy the obligation thus created. Regarding the regulations
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in this light, therefore, as well as in that of correct public policy,
it is seen that effect cannot be given to them as a means of protection or escape on the part of the company from all liability for the
performance of its contract. The regulations cannot serve to shield
the company from the consequences resulting from the gross negligence or fraud of its officers or agents, or from the entire failure to
perform the service, no good excuse for such failure being offered
or shown."
We therefore hold that the stipulation purporting to exempt the
corporation defendant from all liability for mistakes or delays in
the transmission or delivery, or for non-delivery of any unrepeated
message, whether happening by negligence of its servants or otherwise, beyond the amount received for sending the same, is void for
want of a consideration to support it. And further, that it is not
competent for telegraph companies to stipulate against or limit their
liability for mistakes happening in consequence of their own fault,
such as want of proper skill or ordinary care on the part of their
operators or the use of defective instruments. See authorities
above cited and Sweatland v. Il. 6Mi8. Tel. Co., 27 Iowa 433;
Wolf v. Western Union, 62 Penn. St. 88; Breese v. U. S. Tel.
Co., 48 N. Y. 132; U. 5. Tel. Co. v. Gildersleve, 29 Md. 232;
Western Union v. Buchanan, 35 Ind. 429; Hfibbard v. Western
Union, 83 Wis. 553; Tel. Co. v. Griswold, 47 Ohio St. 301.
We think the true rule is, that such companies are exempt only
for errors arising from causes beyond their own control. And this
would seem to be the rule adopted by statute in this state; for by
§ 2, 162, of the civil code, it is declared: "A carrier of messages
for reward must use great care and diligence in the transmission
and delivery of messages. A carrier by telegraph must use the
utmost diligence therein."
We are further of opinion that the plaintiff having proved the
mistake in the message as delivered, the onus was upon the defendant to show how it occurred: Tyler v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., supra.
If the error was caused by atmospheric disturbances, or a momentary displacement of the wires, the defendant knew it and ought to
show it. This defendant undertook to do on the trial in the court
below. There was testimony given tending to show that before and
at the time the message in question was sent trouble was experienced in the transmission of dispatches, owing to the condition of

HART v. WESTERN UNION TEL. CO.

the weather; that it was foggy and stormy. It was further made
to appear that in the telegraphic code the following lines and dots,
when transmitted along the wire, made the word "bail:"
And that the word "bain" is expressed by the following:
There was also testimony tending to show that the operators at
Stockton 'and San Francisco were competent, and that the one
at San Francisco was especially careful in the matter of this dispatch. The latter testified that she took particular pains with the
message in question, "as is shown by the mark under one of
the cipher words-the last word, because it was an unusual word'falun.'
I asked Mr. Dixon to repeat it, and I put a little mark,
fx,' under it, to show that it was repeated. The other words being
ordinary words, I paid no attention to, because it is something very
likely to be received' in any message."
There was also given on behalf of the defendant further testimony
tending to show that the error resulting in the change of the word
"bail" to "bain," was caused by a break in the electric current,
and that this, in turn, was caused by atmospheric influences prevailing at the time, and, of course, beyond the control of defendant.
If such was the fact, the verdict should have been for the defendant. But it was a question of fact for the jury, under appropriate
instructions from the court. The court should have told the jury
that the mistake in the message, as delivered, being admitted, the
presumption was that it occurred through the negligence of defendant, but that if they believed from the evidence that the mistake
occurred through a cause or causes beyond defendant's control, such
as a break in the electric current, produced by atmospheric influences, their verdict should be for the defendant. We think this
question, which was the turning one in the case, was not fairly
submitted to the jury in the court below, and we must, therefore,
remand the case for a new trial.
Judgment and order reversed and cause remanded for a new trial.
McKiNSTRY J., and MCKEE, J., concurred.
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Supreme J-udicial Court of Massachusetts.
CHARLES H. CLEMENT v.WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO.
A stipulation in a telegraph blank that the company shall not be liable for mistakes or delays in the transmission or delivery of any unrepeated message, whether
happening by negligence or otherwise, beyond the amount received for sending the
same, is valid and binding, and the sender of such a message cannot recover beyond

the amount paid, even though the delay was caused by the negligence of the company's servant in delivering the message.
Although the telegraph blank with the printed conditions is not used, if the sender
is aware of the conditions under which the company by its rules accepts and transmits messages, he is bound by such conditions.
TORT for injuries sustained by the plaintiff in consequene of
the neglect of the defendant seasonably to deliver a message sent
by telegraph. In the Superior Court, the- case was sent to an
auditor, who found the following facts:
On April 27th 1880, the plaintiff, who lived in Haverhill, had a
libel of divorce pending in the Supreme Judicial Court, then sitting in Salem, and had arranged with H. P. Moulton, his attorney,
to give him notice when the case was to come on. The case being
in order for the next day, Moulton, on the 27th, left at the office
of the American Union Telegraph Company in Salem the following message: "Salem, April 27th 1880. To Charles H. Clement,
2 Benjamin Street, Haverhill, Mass. Come to-morrow with witnesses. H. P. Moulton.,"
The office at the time was in charge of the- office boy only, and
nothing was said as to whether the American Union Telegraph
Company had a line to Haverhill or not. That company had no
line to Haverhill, and the operatoi, upon her return to the office,
finding this message, endeavored ineffectually to communicate with
Moulton, but not finding him at his office, she left a note for him
stating the fact, and that the message had been, or would be, sent
by the Western Union Telegraph Company. Not being able to
inform Moulton that her company had no line to Haverhill, she
tore off the heading printed upon the blank above the message
written, and sent the message to the office of the Western Union
Telegraph Company, also in Salem, for transmission to Haverhill;
and it was there received by the defendant's agent and duly transmitted to their office in Haverhill. The message did not appear to
have been rewritten upon a blank of the defendant company, but
the terms and conditions upon which the defendant by its rules
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provided that messages should be sent over its line, as set forth in
the form or blank in use by it, were in fact known to Moulton, and
this form of blank had been in use by him in sending messages by
the defendant's line. Subsequently to the sending of the message,
and after April 27th, the operator of the American Union Telegraph Company explained to Moulton how it was sent by that line,
and Moulton said to her that it was all right.
The form in use by the defendant corporation contained, among
other stipulations the following: "All messages taken by this company subject to the following terms : To guard against mistakes or
delays, the sender of a message should order it repeated ; that is,
telegraphed back to the originating office for comparison. For
this, one half the regular rate is charged in addition. It is agreed
between the sender of the following message and this company,
that said company shall not be liable for mistakes or delays in the
transmission or delivery, or for non-delivery, of any unrepeated message, whether happening by negligence of its servants or otherwise,
beyond the amount received for sending the same."
The message was received at the office of the defendant in Haverhill about fifteen minutes before eight o'clock in the evening of
April 27th 1880. It was held at the office until the hour of closing, at eight o'clock, when it was given with others to the messenger
boy for delivery. The plaintiff lived at No. 2 Benjamin Street, in
Haverhill, distant from the defendant's office something more than
half a mile. There was no evidence whether any effort was made
by the messenger to deliver the message, except the fact that the
message was returned to the office the next morning with the
report that he could not find the plaintiff. The message was not
in fact received by the plaintiff until May 2d.
On April 28th the case was reached in its order, and the court
ordered the libel dismissed because the libellant and his witnesses
were not present. The failure of the plaintiff to attend court was
by reason of the non-delivery of Moulton's message aforesaid in
season for the plaintiff or his witnesses to be in attendance when
the case was reached.
The plaintiff had incurred expense for counsel fees in the libel
suit, and for the attendance of himself and witnesses at prior terms
of the court, and for the libellee's costs.
Upon these facts, the auditor found that the message in question
was sent upon and subject to, the condition and agreement, that,
V0oL. XXXIII.-42
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unless it was repeated or insured, no damages beyond the cost of
the message could be recovered for any failure or delay in the delivery of it, that the defendant, by its agents, was guilty of gross
negligence in not delivering said message to the plaintiff, or at his
place of abode, to which it was directed ; that the message was sent
by Moulton under an arrangement and agreement that the plaintiff
should so receive notice when his case was to be reached in order
for trial, but that the defendant and its agents receiving and transmitting said message were not informed of the circumstances under
which it was sent, nor as to its importance, or of any especial or
peculiar injury or damage that might result from neglect or failure
to transmit or deliver the same; and that the defendant was not
liable for the items of damage claimed, except for the sum of
twenty-five cents paid for the cost of the message, with interest
thereon from the date of the writ.
In the Superior Court, the case was tried before ROCKWELL, J.,
without a jury, on the auditor's report. The judge ruled that the
'plaintiff was only entitled to recover the amount paid for sending
the message, and found for him accordingly. The plaintiff alleged
exceptions.
R.

. Merrill and . 0. Wrardwell, for the plaintiff.

G. S. Hale and C. F. Walcott, for the defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MORTON, C. J.-The evidence was sufficient to justify the auditor and the presiding justice of the Superior Court in finding that
the contract with the defendant, imiade by the plaintiff through his
agent Moulton was subject to the conditions and stipulations contained in the form issued by the defendant. One of these stipulations is as follows: " It is agreed between the sender of the following message and this company, that said company shall not be liable
for mistakes or delays in the transmission or delivery, or for nondelivery, of any unrepeated message, whether happening by negligence of .its servants or otherwise, beyond the amount received
for sending the same."
It has been held' in this commonwealth, that a regulation or
stipulation of this character is reasonable and binding upon the parties to it: Grinnell v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 113 Mass.
299, and cases cited. In the case at bar, the plaintiff did not
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repeat his message, and it follows that, under the contract which
he made, he can recover only twenty-five cents, the cost of the
message.
The plaintiff contends that, as the auditor has found that the
defendant by its agents was guilty of gross negligence in not
delivering the message seasonably, this stipulation does not exempt
the defendant from liability for the damages actually sustained.
The only negligence shown in this case was an unexplained
delay in delivering the message on the part of the messenger boy,
to whom it was, after its receipt, entrusted for delivery. It may
be that the company might be guilty of some fraudulent or gross
negligence in transmitting or delivering a message, so that it
would not be protected by its regulation from liability for the
actual damages, though in excess of the sum stipulated. But the
negligence of the messenger boys in delivering messages was plainly
contemplated by the parties when they entered into the stipulation; and there are no principles of public policy which should
prevent the company from stipulating that it will not be responsible
for such negligence beyond a fixed amount, unless it receives a
reasonable compensation for assuming further responsibility.
Without discussing the question as to what is the difference, if
any, between ordinary and gross negligence, we are of opinion that
the only negligence proved in this case was such negligence as the
parties intended to include in their stipulation; and that such
stipulation, as applied to such negligence, is reasonable and valid.
It follows that the Superior Court rightly ruled and found that the
plaintiff was entitled to recover only twenty-five cents.
Exceptions overruled.
DUTY or TELEGRAPH CO31PAIES AS
TO MESSAGES.-Although there are some
cases to the contrary: Parks v. A. 0.
Tel. Co., 13 Cal. 422; Baldwin v. U.
S. Tel. Co., 1 Lans. 125, the weight of
A~trity clearly is that telegraph companies are not common carriers : Birney
v. N. Y. 6- W. T. Co., 18 Md. 341;
W. U. T. Co., v. Carew, 15 Mich. 525;
Breese v. U. S. Tel. Co., 45 Barb.
274.
They, however, exercise a public employment, with duties and obligations
analogous to those of common carriers

and other public servants: Graham v.
Davis, 4 Ohio St. 377; Telegraph Co.
v. Griswold, 37 Id. 311; Breese v. U.
S. Tel. Co., 48 N. Y. 132; Passmore
v. W. U. Td. Co., 78 Penn. St. 238;
Tyler v. V. U. Tel. Co., 60 Ill. 421.
They must transmit all prepaid messages presented for transmission (Breese
v. U. S. Tel. Co., 48 N. Y. 132), excepting such as are indecent or contrary
to.law (W. U. Tel. Co. v. Ferguson, 57
Ind. 495), with a care and diligence
adequate to the business: Breese v. U.
S. Tel. Co., 48 N. Y. 132.
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Ordinary care and diligence must at
least be used by the company: Pope v.
W. U. Tel. Co., 9 I1. App. 284. This
means more than that the company need
deliver a message only at the office of
the receiver. If he is not there it must
use ordinary diligence to find him: Pope
v.W. U. Tel. Co., 9 111. App. 284. It
must send the message not merely to the
telegraph station, but to the person addressed: W. U. Tel. Co. v. Lindley, 62
Ind. 371, Messages must be sent with
reasonable promptitude, though what is
reasonable depends upon the circumstances of each case, and is to be determined by a jury: Bedan v. W. U. Tel.
Co., 8 Biss. 131. It is not the duty of
the company to keep more than one operator at a small station, and delay while
he is at dinner is not negligence: Behm
v. W. U. Tel. Co., 8 Biss. 131. Nor is
delay at a repeating office unreasonable:
Behm v.W. U. Tel. Co., 8 Biss. 131.
All messages must be transmitted in the
order of time in which they are received;
unreasonable discrimination is prohibited
by law : Davis v. W. U. Tel. Co., 1
Cin. 100; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Ward, 23
Ind. 377 ; and punitive damages have
been held allowable for wilful and unjust discrimination: Davis v. W. U. Tel.
Co., I Cin. 100. But private dispatches
must yield to those given precedence by
statute-e. g., press dispatches--or to
dispatches of a public nature: W. U.
Tel. Co. v. Ward, 23 Ind. 377.
LIABXLITY.---The method of enforcing
the faithful performance of its duties by
a telegraph company is found in the
pecuniary responsibility which they incur
for failure: Tdegraph Co. v. Griswold,
37 Ohio St. 311. Generally a telegraph
company is liable for any loss or damage
caused by its negligence in transmitting
and delivering messages: N. Y. 4 W.
Tel. Co. v. Dryburg, 35 Penn. St. 298;
U. S. Tel. Co. v. Gildersleve, 29 Md.
233; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Fontaine, 58 Ga.
433, and cases iqfra. Instances wherein
it has been held liable, are, amongst

others, the following: For unreasonably
delaying a message announcing the death
of the receiver's mother: So Relle v. W.
U. Tel. Co., 55 Tex. 308; Logan v.
W. U. Tel. Co., 84 Il. 468. For its messenger negligently permitting a forged
dispatch saying a draft was genuine, to
be substituted for one saying the sender
(a bank) "had drawn no such bill,"
and this notwithstanding the plaintiff
might recover from the person to whom
the draft was paid: Strause v. W. U.
Tel. Co., 8 Biss. 104. For the negligence of an operator in not knowing of
a county seat on the line : W. U. Tel.
Co. v. Buchanan, 35 Ind. 430. For loss
caused by failure to deliver correct market reports: Turnerv. Tel. Co., 41 Ia.
458. And such reports are presumed to
have been correctly given to the telegraph
company contracting to furnish them.
For delay in delivering a message to attach certain property: Bryant v. Am. Tel.
Co., I Daly 576, and the plaintiff need
not exhaust his remedies against the
debtor before suing the company: Idem.
For changing an order to buy, 500 bales
toonetobuy2500: W. "LN. 0. Tel. Co.
v. Hobson, 15 Grat. (Va.) 122. For a
failure to forward beyond an interimediate
office: U. S. Tel. Co. v. Wenger, 55
Penn. St. 262. For sending a message
authorizing a bank to give credit when
the operator knew the sender was not
the cashier by whom the message purported to have been signed, and knew
that the sender had no authority to act
for such cashier: Elwood v. W. U. Tel.
Co., 45 N. Y. 549. For delay in sending a message by an attorney directing
that a case "on call" be held without
adjournment until he could come:
,Spraguev. W. U. Tel. Co., 6 Daly 200.
But a telegraph company is not liable
for errors or imperfections in transmitting messages which arise from causes
not within its control ; that is, a failure
of the electrical current, irregularities in
its power or efficiency, and interruptions
or confusions arising from storm or wind,
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heat or cold; nor from imperfections in
the working of the wires arising from
necessary imperfections or inherent characteristics in the metals, or from things
necessarily pertaining to the business of
communicating by telegraph, or the machinery and implements invented for that
purpose: Whitc v. W. U. Tel. Co., 14
Fed. R. 710 ; Siweatland v.1. 4- M. Tel.
Co., 27 Ia. 433.

by the telegraph company's negligence :
W. U. Tel. Co. v. Hopkins, 49 Ind. 224.
P AnTiEs.-Either the receiver or the
sender of a message may sue the telegraph company for negligence in transmitting or delivering it: Aiken v. Tel.
Co., 5 S. C. 358; W. U. Tel. Co. v.
Fenton, 52 Ind. 1; Rose v. U. S. Tel.
Co., 3 Abb. Pr. N. S. 409; 34 How.
Pr. 308 ; but it has been decided that
the sender cannot sue a connecting teleSAME-CONNECTING LINEs.-Cougraph company for its negligence. He
necting telegraph companies are bound
must sue the company with whom he
to transmit messages at the request of
made his contract: Thurn v. Alta Tel.
other companies, and are liable for negCo., 15 Cal. 473. In Maryland it is
ligence in not doing so: Baldwin v. U.
decided that a broker telegraphing an
S. Tel. Co., 54 Barb. 505. The agency
order may sue in his own name, but
of one company to take messages for anas trustee for his principal, for damother has been presumed: Baldwin v. U.
ages in delaying it: U. S. Tel. Co.
S. Tel. Co., 54 Barb. 505; 1 Lans.
v. Gildersleve, 29 Md. 232. In New
125. But see s. c. 45 N. Y. 744. A
York it is decided that the broker canlimitation of liability applies only to the
not sue, but the principal must: Rose v.
succeeding
first company, and not to
U. S. Tel. Co., 6 Rob. 305; 3 Abb.
connecting lines: Squire v. W. U. Tel.
Pr. (N. S.) 409; 34 How. Pr. 308. In
statute
requiring
232.
A
Co., 98 Mass.
California it is held that in order to give
telegraph companies under penalty to
a right of action to the principal the fact
take messages from connecting lines is
of the agency must have been disclosed:
beneficial to the public, and should
Turn v. Alta Tel. Co., 15 Cal. 472.
Co.
U.
S.
Tel.
construed:
be liberally
are, however,
DEFENCES. -There
v.W. U. Tel. Co., 56 Barb. 46. But
many exceptions and limitations to the
see Turn v. Alta Tel. Co., 15 Cal. 472.
doctrine that a telegraph company is
If the negligence be by a connecting
liable for damages caused by its delays
company, either the first telegraph comand errors in sending messages. Such
pany or the sender may sue for the pena company may make reasonable rules
alty: U. S. Tel. Co. v. W. U. Tel. Co.,
and regulations for the transaction of its
54 Barb. 46; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Ward,
business, non-observance of which may
23 Ind. 377.
form a good defence to an action for
COSISDERTIoN.-The mutual obli- damages against it: U. S. Tel. Co. v.
gations of the sender and the company Gildersleve, 29 Bid. 232 ; Sweatland
are sufficient consideration to maintain v. .4- M. Tel. Co., 27 Ia. 433; Passthe action, although n,. money was paid more v. W. U. Tel. Co., 78 Penn. St.
for transmission: W. U. Tel. Co. v.
238; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Graham, 1 Col.
Meek, 49 Ind. 53.
T. 230; W. U. Td. Co. v. Buchanan.
35 Ind. 430; Breese v. U. S. Tel. Co.,
NATuRE oF AcTIox.-The action for
damages for a failure to deliver a mes- 48 N. Y. 132.
Thus, a rule that the company will
sage may be at common law or by
statute. Although an action ex delicto not be liable for the correct transmission
it is founded upon a contract ; and that of the message beyond the amount recontract is the contract to transmit, not ceived therefor, unless repeated at an
the contract the benefit of which was lost additional expense, is a reasonable regn-
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lation: Becker v. T. U.

Tel. Co., 11

Neb. 87; Redpath v. V. U. Tel. Co.,
112 Mass. 71; Schwartzv. A. 6- P. Tel.
Co., 18 Hun 157; Warn v. TV. U.
Tel. Co., 37 Mo. .t72; Breese v. U. S.
Tel. Co., 45 Barb. 274 ; Camp v. W.
U. Tel. Co., I Mete. (Ky.) 164; U. S.
Tel. Co. v. Gildersleve, 29 Md. 232;
Sweatland v. . 6 M. Tel. Co., 27 Ia.
433.
There can be no recovery on an unrepeated message unless gross negligence
or fraud is proved: Redpatk v. W. U.
Tel. Co., 112 Mass. 71. Nor is proof
of a mistake in an unrepeated message
prima facie proof of negligence: Sweatland v. L 4- M. Tel. Co., 27 Ia. 434;
Becker v. TV. U. Tel. Co., 11 Neb.
87.
But a rule exempting from liability
where the message is unrepeated does not
apply where the company makes no effort
to send the message: Birney v. N. Y.
4 W. Tel. Co., 18 Md. 341. Nor is a
failure to repeat a defence against a failU. Tel. Co. v. Graham,
ure to deliver: WV.
I Col. T. 230. But it has been decided
that non-observance of such a rule is a
good defence even though the mistake is
of such a kind as would not have been
prevented by repetition: Grinnell v. W.
U. Tel. Co., 113 Mass. 299. The rule
as to repetition has aso been held void
. U. Tel. Co. v. Tyler, 74
in law:
Ill. 168; and again, to exempt from
such errors only as arose from causes beyond the control of the company : Idem.
See, also, Fassmore v. W. U. Tel. Co.,
9 Phil. 90.
So, also, a telegraph company may
make a rule as to the time and manner
of presenting claims to it for damages,
as that such claims shall be presented
within sixty diys from sending the messages : Woff v. WV.U. Tel. Co., 62 Penn.
St. 83 ; Young v. W. U. T. Co., 65 N.
Y. 163; and presentment of an imperfect claim for damages within sixty days
to a clerk not authorized to audit it, is
not compliance with the condition, even

though the proper officer be temporarily
absent: Young v. W. U. Tel. Co., 65
N. Y. 163; and the words "presented
in writing," mean that the claim shall
be delivered and left with the proper
official: Idem. So a rule requiring presentment in tventy days is lawful:
Aiken v. Tel. Co., 5 S. C. 358.
Ordinarily the conditions upon which
messages are received for transmission
are printed upon blanks furnished by the
company upon which to write messages.
The sender of the message is held bound
by the conditions so printed on the blank
he uses: Breese v. TV. U. TeL, Co., 45
Barb. 274; TV. U. Tel. Co. v. Carew,
15 Mich. 525 ; Young v.W. U. T. Co.,
65 N. Y. 163; 34 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 390;
Birneyv. N.Y. 4 W. Tel. Co., 18 Md.
342. The receiver also is bound by such
conditions: Aiken v. Tel. Co., 5 S. C.
358. So is any person sending a message, if he knows of the rules or conditions, whether be uses a blank containing
them or not ; V. U. Tel. Co. v. Buchanan,
35 Ind. 429. Knowledge will be inferred
against him from his long possession and
constant use of the blanks : Breese v. U. S.
Tel. Co., 48 N. Y. 132. There must be
an actual express or implied contract to
Notice merely
abide by the conditions.
of such conditions will not release from
liability: Baldwin v. U. S. Tel. Co., I
.Lans. 125. Although the conditions be
printed in small type, yet if the heading
calling attention to them be in large
type, they will be binding: Wolf v. W.
U. Tel. Co., 62 Penn. St. 83. And
rules established by law are part of the
contract : U. S. Tel. Co. V. Gildersleve,
29 Md. 232.
Sometimes the company's negligence
is not the proximate cause of the damage, and it is held not liable, although
clearly guilty of an error. Thus, where
B. telegraphed A. for $500 and the
message read $5000, which was sent,
whereupon B. absconded with it. BEeld,
that the telegraph company was not
liable: Lowery v. W. U. Tel. Co., 60
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See, also, First 1Nat. Bank

v. W. U. T. Co., 30 Ohio St. 555.

An impostor, at Cincinnati, sent a dispatch in the name of B. over defendant's
line, to C., at Selma, Ala., requesting
C. to send a telegraphic money order to
C. thereupon purB.. at Cincinnati.
chased of defendant, at Selma, a telegraphic money order payable to B. at
Cincinnati, and defendant paid the money
there to the impostor who was tile sendec
of the message: Held: First. Where
there is nothing to create suspicion in
the minds of the agents of a telegraph
company, it is the duty of thIe party of
whom the request is made to remit the
money, to ascertain for himself whether
lie who makes the request is the person
he professes to be. Second. In the absence of anything arousing suspicion,
the telegraph company has no right to
refuse payment of the money to him in
reply to whose message it was sent; and
it is not liable for a payment made bona
.fide to such person, though it turns out
that he was an impostor: W. U. Tel.
Co. v. Heyer, 61 Ala. 159.
Acceptance of the amount paid by the
sender for transmission is not a defence :
W. U. Tel. Co. v. Buchanan, 35 Ind.
430. Neither is it a good defence that
lines were in good order and competent
and faithful servants employed: W. U.
The
Tel. Co. v. Mfeek, 49 Ind. 53.
fact that the negligence occurred out of
the state from which the message was
sent, and which state gave by its statute
the action for the penalty, will not defeat the suit: W. U. Tel. Co. v. Hamilton, 50 Ind. 181. And an inetfectual
attempt to deliver a message after business hours, or on Sunday, is no excuse
for a failure to deliver: W. U. Tel. Co.
v. Lindley, 62 Ind. 371. But the fact
that the person to whom the message
was addressed did not live within a specified distance of the telegraph station
may be matter of defence : Ibid.
PLEADING.-In

a

penalty for a failure

suit to recover a

to transmit, the

complaint must, as required by the statute, aver that the defendant was '' engaged in telegraphing for the public."
An averment that it was "engaged in
the business of transmitting telegraphic
messages for hire" will not suffice; nor
will it be helped by the court taking judicial notice of the fact that the company
is a public servant: I. U. Tel. Co. v.
Axtell, 69 Ind. 199. See, also, IV. U.
Tel. Co. v. Ferguson, 57 Ind. 495.
EVIDENctE.-The onus is on the plaintiff to prove negligence: U. S. Tel. Co.
T. Gildersleve, 29 Md. 233 ; and upon
the company to excuse a mistake: Turner v. Tel. Co., 41 Ia. 458.
Failure to transmit and deliver the message in the form or language in which it
is received, is primafacie negligence, for
which the company is liable, and to exonerate itself from liability thus presumptively arising it must show that the
mistake was not attributable to its fault
or negligence : Telegraph Co. v. Griswold,
37 Ohio St. 313 ; Bartlett v. IV. U. Tel.
Co., 62 Me. 209 ; Rittenhouse v. Independent L. Tel. Co., 44 N.Y. 263; Tyler
v. IV. U. Tel. Co., 60 Ill. 421 ; Baldwin
v. U. S. Tel. Co., 45 N. Y. 744; WV.
U. Tel. Co. v. Careo, 15 Mich. 525;
DeLa Grange v. S. If. Tel. Co., 25 La.
Ann. 383 ; IV U. Tel. Co. v. Meek, 49
Ind. 53 ; Turner v. Elawkeye Tel. Co.,
41 Ia. 458.
In a suit against a telegraph company
for a failure to deliver a message, the
original message given the.operator must
be given in evidence or its absence accounted for: TV. U. Tel. Co. v. Hopkins,
49 Ind. 223. An operator's admission
of error, made several days after the
message was sent, is not evidence against
the company, not being part of the res
gestcr: Aiken v. Tel. Co., 5 S. C. 358.
See, also, Sweatland v. I. J-. . Tel. Co.,
27 Ia. 433. The mere fact of an error
in an unrepeated message, is not, without further proof ofcarelessness, sufficient
to authorize a recovery of more than the
sum paid for transmission : Becker v.
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W. U. Tel. Co., 11 Neb. 87. Evidence
of a local usage in the telegraph office is
inadmissible to vary the terms of the
contract by which the message was sent:
Grinnell v. W. U. Tel. Co., 113 Mass.
299. Nor is evidence admissible that the
company made a deduction from the pay
of the operator on account of tie negligence: Grinnell v. W. U. T. Co., 113
Mass. 299.
Telegrams are often used as evidence
of contracts between the sender and the
receiver. The partywho sends an order
by telegraph makes the telegraph company
his agent to transmit and deliver it. He
is bound by the message as delivered :
Dunning v. Roberts, 35 Barb. 463; and
where the legal rights of the receiver
founded upon such order are in question,
he is entitled to put in evidence the 'message actually received, as the original:
Saveland v. Green, 40 Wis. 431. See,
also, Taylor v. Steamboat R. Co., 20
Mo. 254; Commonwealth v. Jejffries, 7
Allen 548. But a dispatch offered in
evidence must be proved to be authentic
(Richie v. Bass, 15 La. Ann. 668) either
by proof of the operator's handwriting or
otherwise. But a wife's telegrams cannot be used against her husband: Benford
v. Sanner, 40 Penn. St. 9.
A telegraph company may be required to produce telegrams for use
as evidence upon subpona duces tecum,
and this notwithstanding a statute making it a misdemeanor for any person
employed in transmitting messages by
telegraph to make known the contents
of any message to any person except to
him to whom it is addressed, or to his
agent or attorney: Woods v. Miller, 55
Ia. 168. And see Ex parte Brown, 7
Mo. App. 484. Nor can the manager
of a telegraph 6ompany refuse to produce
a telegram, upon order so to do by a
court, on the ground that, by so doing,
he would violate his duty to the company, and he is pumishable for contempt
if he refuse: Ex parte Brown, 7 Mo.
App. 484. But while an agent of a

company is punishable for contempt in
refusing to produce messages in possession of the company before a brand
jury, on proper process, a subpcena duces
tecum merely describing such messages
by the names of the senders and the persons addressed aud as sent "within
fifteen months last past," is not such
process: Ex parte 'Brown, 72 Mo. 83;
37 Am. Rep. 426. See, also, Ex parte
Brown, 7 Mo. App. 484.
DA
vsAGE.-Tlhe general rule is that
a party injured by error, delay, or failure, by negligence, in transmitting and
delivering a telegram, is entitlqd to recover all his damages, including gains
prevented as well as losses sustained.
This rule is subject to two qualifications :
The damages must be such as may fairly
be supposed to have entered into the
contemplation of the parties when they
made the contract; that is, such as
might naturally be expected to follow its
violation, and they must be certain:
Landsbeger v. Am. Tel. Co., 32 Barb.
533; Griffln v. Colver, 16 N. Y. 489 ;
Baldwin v. U. S. Tel. Co., 1 Lans. 125.
Instances of the application of the rule
that a telegraph company is not liable for
all damages which may arise from its
negligence in sending and delivering a
message, the importance of which it is
not informed and cannot estimate from
reading the dispatch, are these : Where
the dispatch is in cipher, or obscurely
worded, nominal damages only are recoverable, unless the company has been
informed of its nature : Candee v. W.
U. Tel. Co., 34 Wis. 471 ; BeAm v.
W. U. Tel. Co., 8 Biss. 131; W. U.
Td. Co. v. Martin, 9 Bradw. 596 ;
Baldwi, v. U. S. Tel. Co., 45 N. Y.
744; White v. W. U. Tel. Co., 14 Fed.
H. 710; Maccayv. W. U. Tel. Co., 16
Nev. 222. Thus, the company was held
not liable where the message was " Sell
fifty (50) gold," not having been told
that this meant "Sell $50,000 of gold :"
U. S. Tel. Co. v. Gildersleve, 29 Md.
233. The fact that the employees to
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whom the message was delivered knew
TV. U. Tel. Co., 44 N. Y. Superior Ct.
the sender was a stock operator, and that 487 ; 7 Abb. N. Cas. 151.
he informed the boy in the office that the
A telegraphic order for sacks of salt
dispatch required promptness, is not was transmitted casks. The casks were
sufficient information of its nature: Can- shipped and had to be sold at below the
dee v. W. U. Tel. Co., 34 Wis. 471.
market price at the place of shipment.
So, where A. wrote B. : "Have you fleld, that the difference between such
any more northwestern mess pork, or market price and the selling price, toprime mess ? Also extra mess ? Tele- together with the expense of transportagraph price on receipt of this." B. tion, was not an improper measure of
replied by wire thus : "Letter received. damages: Burton v. Tel. Co., 41 N.
No light mess here. Extra mess twenty- Y. 545.
For delaying a dispatch ordering an
eight seventy-five ($28.75)."
And A.
rejoined by telegraph: "Dispatch re- attachment until other creditors obtained
ceived. Will take two hundred extra attachments exhausting the assets of the
mess, price named," which dispatch was debtor, the amount of the sender's claim
delayed. Reld, that A. could not re- has been held recoverable (Parks v.
cover damages occasioned by an advance Alta Tel. Co., 13 Cal. 422), less any
in the meat during the delay: Beaupre sum which the sender may have received
v. P. 4 A. Tel. Co., 21 Minn. 155. on account of his debt: Bryant v. Am.
Nor will a telegraph company be liable Tel. Co., I Daly 576.
for delaying a cipher dispatch, although
Where an incorrect telegraphie market
the telegraph manager knew such dis- report induced A. to buy, he was held
patches ordinarily related to mining and entitled to the difference between the acstock speculations, there being no ex- tual purchase price and that stated in the
planation of the importance of the par- report: Turner v. Hutckeye Tel. Co., 41
ticular dispatch in question: Mackay v. Ia. 458. An advance in the price of
V. U. Tel. Co., 16 Nev. 222. But a stock ordered has been held to be the
message, "Will you give one fifty for measure of damages: V. S. Tel. Co. v.
twenty-five hundred at London ? AnWenger, 55 Penn. St. 262.
swer at once, as I have only till night,"
On failure to deliver promptly a mesis not obscure or in cipher so as to fall sage to " ship oil soon possible," tie
witlin the meaning of a stipulation that profits which might have been made on
the company " assumed no liability for the oil if the message had been delivered
errors in cipher or obscure messages :" and the oil sent in due time, are not the
Telegraph Co. v. Griswold, 37 Ohio St. measure of damages, but plaintiff may
301.
recover the money paid by him for transThe measure of damages has also been mitting the message, the advance in
passed upon in the following cases :
freight, and his expenses incurred by
Dispatch: " Can close Valkyria and failure of defendant to fulfil the conOthere, 22, 20, net Montreal. Ans. tract: IF. U. Tel. Co. v. Graham, I
immediately." Held, that the commis- Col. T. 230.
sions which the sender could have earned
Where a message to "buy five Hudas a broker in effecting a charter for the son" was delivered as " buy five
two vessels named Valkyria and Othere,
hundred," and before it could be corif the message had been duly transmit- rected an advance occurred by which
ted, were not damages either actually sender lost $1375, this sum was held to
contemplated or fairly supposed to have be tie measure of damages: Rittenhouse
been contemplated by defendant, and, v. I. L. Tel. Co., 44 N. Y. 263.
therefore, not recoverable: McCall v.
If a telegraph company contract to
VOL. XXXIII.-43
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transmit without any special restriction

True v. Int.

of their liability a message accepting an
offer to sell certain goods at a certain
place for a certain price, and by their
negligence in delivering it the sender
fails to complete the purchase, he may
recover from them, in damages, the
difference between the price which, by
the message, he agreed to pay, and the
price he would have been compelled to
pay at the same place in order, with use
of due diligence, to have puichased goods
there of the same kind, quality and
quantity: Squire et al. v. TV. U. Tel.
Co., 98 Mass. 232. See, also, True v.
1. Tel. Co., 60 Me. 9.
Damages for failure to obtain employment as a pilot have been held not
remote or speculative: W. U. Tel. Co.
v. Fenton, 52 Ind. I; and in any case
of telegraphic negligence nominal damages are recoverable, although actual
damages be not proved: First Nat. Bk.
v. Tel. Co., S0 Ohio St. 555; and, indeed, damages need not be proved ;
where a case of negligence is made out,
they will be presumed: Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Buchanan, 35 Ind.
430.
The California and Massachusetts
cases placed at the head of this note are
opposed to each other in their rulings as
to the right of a telegraph company to
release itself by contract from liability
for negligence. Without attempting to
reconcile this conflict of authority,
which, perhaps, is impossible, it may
be well to call attention to the decisions
sustaining the views expressed in each
of the cases.
The general rule is undoubtedly the
same in the case of telegraph companies
as with carriers. They cannot, by
contract, relieve themselves from liability for negligence. In aflirming this
rule the California cases are sustained
by the following decisions: Tyler v. W.
U. Tel. Co., 60 Ill. 421 ; Sweatland v.
S. 4- 3f. Tel. Co., 27 Ia. 432 ; Alanville v. W. U. Tel. Co., 37 Id. 214;

Y. W. U. Tel. Co., 62 Id. 209; W. U.

Co., 60 Me. 9; Bartlett

Tel. Co. v. Graham, I Cal. 230; Tel.
CJo. v. Grimold, 37 Ohio St. 301;
RHzbard v. W. U. Tel. Co., 33 Wis.
558 ; Candee v. W. U. Tel. Co., 34 Id.
471; TV. U. Tel. Co. v. Fontaine, 58
Ga. 433; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Blanchard,
68 Id. 299; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Shotter,
18 Cent. Law Jour. 230 (Georgia
1884) ; Dorgan v. Tel: Co., I Am. L.
T. Rep. (N. S.) 406 (C. C., S. D.
Ala. 1884) ; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Neill,
57 Tex. 283; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Brown,
58 Id. 170; Womack v. W. U. Tel.
Co., Id. 176; W. U. Tel. Co. v.
Catchpole, Tex. Ct. App., Civ. Cas.;
White & Wilson, sect. 268; Camp v.
W. U. Tel. Co., 1 Mete. (Ky.) 164;
Passmore v. W. U. Tel. Co., 78 Penn.
238; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Reynolds, 77
Va. 173; Hord v. W. U. Tel. Co.,
(Super. Ct. Cin., G. T. 1878), 6 Am.
L. Rec. 529; Bell v. Dom. L. Co.
(Super. Ct. Montreal 1880), 25 L. C.
Jur. 248; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Fenton,
52 Ind. 1; Aiken v. Wf. U. Tel. Co., 5
S. C. 358, 372; Express Co. v. Colawell, 21 Wall. 264, 269; .Pinckney V.
W. U. Tel. Co., 19 S. C. 71, 73.
But see, Grinnell v. IW. U. Tel. Co.,
113 Mass. 299; Redpath v. W. U. Tel.
Co., 112 Id. 71; Ellis v. Am. Tel. Co.,
13 Allen 226;' Clement v. W. U. Tel.
Vo., 137 Mass.; Becker v. Wf. U.
Tel. Co., 11 Nab. 87; Breese v. U. S.
Tel. Co., 48 N. Y. 132, per EARt,
Com.; Schwartz v. A. 4- P. Tel. Co.,
18 Hun 157; White v. W. U. Tel. Co.,
5 McCrary 103; Jones v. W. U. Tel.
Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 717 ; Macandrew v.
El. Tel. Co., 17 C. B. 3; Potts v. El.
S. Co., 18 Law Rep. 477; Wann v.
W. U. Tel. Co., 37 Mo. 472; Lassiter v. W. U. Tel. Co., 18 Fed. Rep.
90.
But it appears that in Massachusetts,
Nebraska and Missouri, telegraph companies may contract against liability for
negligence, although a railroad company
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may not do so. Compare Schall District
in fedfield v. B. H. 4- E. Rd. Co., 102
Mass. 552, with Grinnell v. W. U. Tel.
Co., 113 Id. 299, 306; Redpath v. W.
U. Tel. Co., 112 Id. 71 ; Ellis v. Am.
Tel. -Co., 13 Alien 226. Compare
also, Kirby v. Adams Ex. Co., 2 Ao.
App. 369; and Drew v. Red Line
Transit Co., 3 Alo. App. 495, with
Wann v. 11'. U. Tel. Co., 37 Mo. 472.
Compare, also, A. 4- N. R. Co. v.
Washburn, 5 Neb. 117, with Becker v.
W. U. Tel. Co., 11 Id. 87.
The weight of anthority is therefore
in favor of denying the validity of contracts against liability for the telegraph
company's negligence.
The decision of the California case is,
however, opposed to the weight of
authority in ruling upon the liability
of the telegraph company for damages
resulting from errors in transmitting
cipher dispatches. "It is true, that in
two or three early cases, the doctrine
has been advanced that a telegraph company is liable to its employer for the
actual and proximate loss that he sustained through the breach of a contract
to communicate a message intelligible to
the person addressed, although the con-

pany was entirely ignorant when it
made the contract of the meaning of the
message: " Gray on Tel. Comnunication, sect. 87, citing Strasburger V. Ir
U. Tel. Co. (Super. Ct. N. Y. 1867),
Allen's Tel. Cas. 661 ; Rittenhouse v.
Ind. Line of Tel., I Daly 474 ; s. c. 44
N. Y. 263; Bowen v. L. E. Tel. Co.
(Coin. Pl. Ohio), 1 Am. Law Reg.
685. See, also, Dougherty v. Am. Tel.
Co. (S. C. Ala. 1884), 18 Cent. L. J.
428. But the general rule is that the
damages recoverable fdr the breach of a
contract to communicate a message of
this description are simply nominal:
Idem. Citing Candeev. V. U. Tel. Co.,
34 Wis. 471; Mackey v. V. U. Tel.
Co., 16 Nev. 222; Dorgan v. Tel. Co.
(C. C., S. D. Ala. 1874), 1 Am. L. T.
Rep. (N. S.) 406; Daniel v. 1V. U.
Tel. o., 61 Tex. 452; Sandurs v.
Stuart, 1 C. P. Div. 326; 15 Chi. Leg.
News 220; TV. U. Tel. Co. v. Reynolds,
77 Va. 173; Douqherty v. Am. Tel. Co.,
18 Cent. L. J. 428; .Pinckney v. W. U.
Tel. Co., 19 S. C. 71, 74. See supra,
Damages. Also, 23 Am. L. Reg. (N.S.)
281.
ADEL:BEiT HAIILToN.
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United States Circuit Court, District of Bhode island.
MEALEY v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE CO.
Where the pleading does not show that an instrument of which profert is made is
under seal oyer is not demandable.
Even though oyer is not demandable if it appears that a knowledge of the paper
is proper or necessary for either party, it is the practice of the court to make an
order for its production.
Where a state statute regulates the practice in making such application, that
practice will be followed in the federal courts.

MOTION

for production and filing of certain papers.

W. T. Angell and 6 Bradley, for plaintiff.

W. G. _?oelker, for defendant.

MEALEY v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
CARPENTER, J.-This is an action on a policy of life insurance,
and the defendant files several pleas setting out that the statements and answers to certain questions contained in the application and medical examination, which form part of the contract of
insurance, are untrue, and specifying the particular statements so
alleged to be untrue, and making profert of the application and
medical examination. The plaintiff now moves for an order on the
defendant to file the application and medical examination in the
clerk's office.
The motion is not properly framed as a demand of oyer, since
the order granting oyer would provide only that the plaintiff have
a copy of the instrument and not that the original instrument be
put on file. The motion has, however, been argued as though it
were a proper demand of oyer, and in that light I have considered
it. In the first place it is to be noted that the plea does not show
that the agreement is under seal, and consequently profert was
unnecessary and oyer cannot be granted.
The authorities cited by the defendant abundantly sustain this
position: 1 Chit. Pl. *430, *431 ; Sneed v. Wister, 8 Wheat. 690.
Indeed, the order here asked seems to be prohibited by implied
exclusion by the twenty-third law rule for this circuit, which
reads as follows:
"Oyer of all specialties declared on may be had on motion at
the return term, but not afterwards, unless by special order of
court on affidavit of special cause."
It was, however, the practice of the English courts, and is the
practice with us, in cases where'oyer is not demandable, but in
which the court can see that a knowledge of the instrument
in question is proper and necessary for either party, to make an
order that he have a copy.
But in the practice of the courts of Rhode Island, which is followed in this court, the proceeding to be taken in order to obtain
an order of this kind is prescribed by the law of the state in Pub.
Stat. cap. 214, sect. 45, which is as follows:
"Whenever either party to any proceeding at law or equity in the
Supreme Court, or to any proceeding at law in the Court of Common
Pleas, shall set forth in writing under oath, upon his knowledge or
belief, that the opposite party is in the possession or control of
some document to which the applicant is entitled, such court or a

